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A simple trading model based on pair pattern strategy space with holding periods is
proposed. Power-law behavior is observed for the return variance σ 2, the price impact H
and the predictability K for both models, with linear and square root impact functions. The
sum of the traders’ wealth displays a positive value for the model with a square root price
impact function, and a qualitative explanation is given based on the observation of the
conditional excess demand 〈A|u〉. The cumulative wealth distribution also obeys a power-
law behaviorwith an exponent close to that of realmarkets. An evolutionary tradingmodel
is further proposed. The eliminationmechanismeffectively changes the behavior of traders,
and a power-law behavior is observed in the measure of zero return distribution P(r = 0).
The trading model with other types of traders, e.g., traders with the MG’s strategies and
producers, are also carefully studied.
1. Introduction
The standard Minority Game (MG) introduced and studied by Challet and Zhang [1,2] was initially designed as a
simplification of Arthur’s famous El Farol’s Bar problem [3]. It describes a system in which many heterogeneous traders
adaptively compete for a scarce resource, and it captures some key features of a generic market mechanism, and the basic
interaction between the traders and public information. However, it is a highly simplifiedmodel, not suitable for comparing
with real financial market trading. Tomake it more realistic in comparisonwith the real markets, different variations [4–10]
of the standard MG are consequently proposed. For example, the inactive strategy is introduced, which grants traders the
possibility of not trading, and thus the number of traders actively trading at each time step varies throughout the game. This
type of extension is called the grand canonical MG, and it produces the main characteristics of the stock markets, e.g., the
‘‘fat tail’’ return distribution, and the long-range volatility correlations.
In the standard MG andmost of its variations, the strategies give predictions for the next time step, based on the current
state of the history, and upon which traders make instantaneous trading actions with a horizon of not more than one time
step. For example, theMG-basedmodelswith dynamic capitals [5,6], inwhich thewealth of the traders is updated according
to the current trading price, and has no relation with trading they have previously done. The payoff raised from the price
change at the next time step is granted to the trader immediately after a single trade. In fact traders have asset holding
periods, and make profits from the price difference between two consecutive trading actions of buying and selling in the
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real stockmarkets. To find a strategy spacewith holding periods, so that traders can open or close their positions, and holding
their positions reasonably is a great challenge for modeling speculation.
Recently, a newmodel based on a simple pattern-based strategy space with holding periods is proposed by Challet [11].
In this model, the strategy space is composed of a sequence of patterns, i.e., history signals. Traders open or close positions
when the current pattern is the pattern listed in the strategy space, and hold positions between patterns. The kind of position
he/she might take, i.e., buying or selling is determined by the average price return between two consecutive occurrences of
patterns. The explicit trading action of buying or selling is not fixed with the patterns. The simplest case, where the strategy
space consists of only one pair of patterns is mainly considered.
Inspired from Challet’s work, we introduce a new pattern-based speculation model, in which the patterns strategy space
is split into several sub-spaces composed by pairs of patterns. Different from Challet’s model, we defined the explicit trading
actions of the pair patterns. One strategy consists of a pair of patterns, which denote the history signals for buying and
selling. It is reasonable to assume that the traders base their decisions on patterns or history signals, since they may have
some experience and knowwhen to buy or sell according to historical signals. The order of the pair patterns does notmatter,
which means the position can be opened by buying/selling if the historical signal for buying/selling comes first. Therefore,
the trader should buy first if he/she wants to sell, or buy only after he/she sells in this model. That is exactly the case in the
real stock markets.
The MG is a negative sum game due to the minority essence of its payoffs. Traders compete for limited market resources
and only those traders in the minority group are rewarded. Challet’s newmodel keeps the minority-game payoffs impacted
by his/her own trade when the trader opens and closes the position. Furthermore, it introduces a new term of majority-
game payoffs raised from the contribution of other traders during his/her holding period. The sum of the payoffs therefore
depends on the trading frequency and reaction time of each trader, and thus makes the dynamics relatively complicated.
For the real financial market, the sum of the social wealth should be positive due to the general increase of social
productivity. Traders arewilling to trade in themarketwhich has a positive or at least zero sumof social wealth. The purpose
of this paper is to construct a pattern-based model which has a zero or positive wealth sum. We first assume a zero wealth
sum in ourmodel by introducing a simplemid-price dynamicswith a linear price impact function. Furthermore, a square root
impact function, revealed by an empirical study of the real stock market [12–14] is considered, and the model consequently
tends to be a positive sum game. The payoff for each trader is naturally determined by the difference between the selling
price and the buying price. We name this model as trading model due to the trading essence of the pair patterns.
In Section 2, we first introduce a pattern-based speculationmodel by Challet, and then introduce our tradingmodel with
pair pattern strategies. A comprehensive comparison between the definition of the strategy space and the payoffs of our
model and that of Challet’s model is presented in detail. Some numerical results of our trading model are subsequently
presented compared with Challet’s model. In Section 3, a dynamic evolution mechanism is introduced to the trading model,
and the process of how traders are washed out, and how their wealth evolves are carefully studied. In Section 4, other types
of traders are introduced to the trading model, and Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2. Trading model with pattern-based strategy space
2.1. A pattern-based speculation model by Challet
The model proposed by Challet [11] consists of N traders, and they base their decisions on patterns. A pattern or history
signal records the possible status of themmost recent outcomes of the price change, so there are P = 2m possible patterns
in total. Each trader i is able to recognize S patterns μi,1, . . . , μi,S , drawn randomly and uniformly from all possible P
patterns at the beginning of the game and kept fixed throughout the game. Therefore, P ≥ S. Each trader i keeps track of the
cumulative price return between two consecutive occurrences of patterns, denoted by Ui,μ→ν , where μ, ν ∈ μi,1, . . . , μi,S
and μ = ν. At time t , the trader may wish to open their position only when the current history signal μ(t) is in his/her
pattern list, that is,μ(t) ∈ {μi,1, . . . , μi,S}. The kind of position he/she might open, ai(t) = ±1 denoting buying and selling,
is determined by average price return between two consecutive occurrences of patterns: if |Ui,μ→ν(t)| > tμ→ν , one buys
a share (Ui,μ→ν(t) > 0) or sells a share (Ui,μ→ν(t) < 0), where tμ→ν is the total number of time-steps between elapsed
patterns μ and ν which is a cumulative value over historical records, and  > 0 is a parameter. Then one holds the position
untilμ(t ′) = ν and closes the position. The excess demand is A(t) =∑Ni=1 ai(t). A linear price impact function is considered,
and thus the price return r(t) is simply defined as
r(t) = p(t + 1) − p(t) = A(t), (1)
where p(t + 1) is the actual price obtained by the traders who place their orders at time t .
Assume thatμ(tμ) = μ and tν is the first subsequent occurrence of pattern ν, the cumulative price returnUi,μ→ν between
pattern μ and ν evolves according to
Ui,μ→ν(tν + 1) = Ui,μ→ν(tμ) + p(tν + 1) − p(tμ + 1) − (1 − |ai(tμ)|)ζi[A(tν) − A(tμ)], (2)
where ζi is a naivety factor indicating the reaction time of trader i. By adjusting the parameters  and ζi, the waiting time
before the traders withdraw from the market is carefully studied.
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If trader i decides to open a position at time ti,μ, and close his/her position at time ti,ν , then his/her payoff is
ai[p(ti,ν + δti,ν) − p(ti,μ + δti,μ)] = −aiA(ti,μ, δti,μ) + ai
∑
ti,μ+δti,μ<t≤ti,ν
a(t) − (−ai)A(ti,ν , δti,ν), (3)
A(ti,μ, δti,μ) =
∑
ti,μ<t≤ti,μ+δti,μ
a(t). (4)
δti,μ and δti,ν are one’s reaction time when he/she opens and closes position, which may due to communication delays, and
the time needed to make a conscious decision. The first and the last terms are minority-game payoffs, which can be easily
recognize by their ‘−’ sign: the trader is rewarded if he/she takes an action opposite to the majority of the orders executed
during the time delay. The central term which has a ‘+’ sign could be regarded as a delayed majority-game payoff: the
trader is rewarded if he/she takes an action consequently proved to be consistent with the majority of the orders executed
during the holding period. Therefore, the traders’ wealth depends on the situation of the market: the relative importance of
minority games decreases as the trading frequency decreases, and increases as the reaction time of each trader increases.
2.2. Trading model with pair pattern strategies
The trading model takes the form of a repeated game with a certain number of traders N . Different from challet’s model,
we split the pattern strategy space into several sub-spaces in units of pair patterns. A strategy consists of a pair of patterns or
history signals, with explicit trading actions, labeled as (μ, ν), whereμ is for buying and ν is for selling. A pattern or history
signal has the same definition as in Challet’s model. Since there is a total of P = 2m possible patterns and the patterns of
one strategy should not repeat, there is a total of 2m(2m − 1) probable pairs of patterns.
At the beginning of the game, each trader randomly picks S ′ strategies from the full strategy space, and keeps them
fixed throughout the game, and thus S ′ ≤ 2m(2m − 1). Each trader i keeps track of the cumulative performance of his/her
pair pattern strategy s, s = 1, . . . , S ′ by assigning a virtual score Ui,s to it. The initial scores of the strategies are set to be
zero. At time t , each trader i adopts the strategy with the highest score si(t), and checks if either of the two patterns of the
highest score strategy is consistentwith the history at thatmoment. If the pattern for buying occurs first, the trader opens an
position by buying, and holds the position until the pattern for selling occurs. Then the trader closes the position by selling.
The trader can also open the position by selling if the pattern for selling occurs first, and then closes the position by buying.
Therefore, themodel is symmetric. The trader opens and closes the position by taking an action ai(t) = ±1, denoting buying
and selling. The excess demand is defined as A(t) =∑Ni=1 ai(t).
The price return is defined with a linear price impact function the same as Eq. (1). Assuming that one of the patterns of a
strategy occurs at time t1, and t2 is the first subsequent occurrence of the other pattern, the score of the strategy is updated
according to the price difference between these two patterns as
Ui,s(t2 + 1) = Ui,s(t1) + p(tsi,ν + 1) − p(tsi,μ + 1), (5)
where si is the strategy of trader i. If the pattern for buying μ occurs first tsi,μ = t1 and tsi,ν = t2, and if the pattern for
selling ν occurs first tsi,ν = t1 and tsi,μ = t2. Therefore, the payoff of the strategy is determined by the profit made from the
strategy, if it is adopted. In our model, we assume the traders are sophisticated and compute the price return perfectly, and
this makes Eq. (5) look like Eq. (2) with ζi = 0. Wealth Wi is assigned to each trader i. If trader i decides to open a position
at time t1 and closes it at time t2, their wealth is updated according to the price return between these two trades as
Wi(t2 + 1) = Wi(t1) + p(ti,ν + 1) − p(ti,μ + 1). (6)
If the trader opens a position by buying first ti,μ = t1 and ti,ν = t2, and if the trader opens a position by selling first ti,ν = t1
and ti,μ = t2.
However, the model with payoffs defined as above is a negative-sum game, which means that the sum of the wealth of
all the traders is negative. Considering the simplest case that the market only has one trader, the payoff of his/her wealth
is always −1 no matter what kind of position he/she might take first. We assume that the model with linear price impact
function has a nature of zero-sum. Inspired by the works in Refs.[8,15], we use a middle price p(t + 12 ) = 12 (p(t +1)+p(t)),
where t + 12 is an artificial time, which could be labeled as t ′ + 1. Supposing that not all the shares are executed at the price
immediately after trading, the traders make trades at the middle price on average. The price return defined with the linear
price impact function is
r(t ′) = p(t ′ + 1) − p(t ′) = 1
2
(A(t ′) + A(t ′ − 1)), (7)
where A(t ′) = A(t). The score of the strategy and the wealth of each trader are consequently updated according to the
middle price, replacing t by t ′ in Eqs. (5) and (6).
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Fig. 1. (Color on line) (a) Price evolution of the trading model with linear price impact function at N = 100, S ′ = 2 and m = 3. (b) Price evolution of the
trading model with square root price impact function for different values of the parameter N and different initial seeds at S ′ = 2 andm = 3. 106 data are
collected after 500 iterations for equilibrium.
Different from Challet’s model we simply assume that traders have no reaction time, and thusmakes δt = 0 in Eq. (3). To
substitute the price return in Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) and sum over all the traders gives the sum of the traders’ wealth at time t ′
∑
i
Wi(t ′) =
∑
i
1≤t ′i,1,t ′i,2≤t ′∑
t ′i,1,t ′i,2
⎡
⎣1
2
A(t ′i,1) +
1
2
A(t ′i,2) +
∑
t ′i,1<τ<t ′i,2
A(τ )
⎤
⎦ , (8)
where t ′i,1 is the time trader i opens a position and t
′
i,2 is the time trader i closes it. For the model with line price impact
function, the sum of the first two terms approximately equals zero, since the number of positions opened by traders equals
to that closed by traders. The sumof the traders’wealth consequently depends on the cumulative access demand contributed
by the traders during the holding periods.
Recent empirical study shows that the volume imbalance seems to have a square root impact on the price return [12–14].
Therefore, we also introduce a square root impact function to the price return as
r(t ′) = p(t ′ + 1) − p(t ′) = 1
2
(sign(A(t ′))
√|A(t ′)| + sign(A(t ′ − 1))√|A(t ′ − 1)|). (9)
The score of the strategy, the wealth of each trader and the sum of the traders’ wealth are consequently updated according
to this price dynamics.
2.3. The results
In Challet’s model, a trader trades between his/her E best pairs of patterns, and therefore E < 12S(S − 1). The simplest
case S = 2, E = 1 is analyzed. We extend the case to S ′ = 2 (S ′ corresponds to E in Challet’s model), so that a trader can
trade between two pairs of patterns. We also assume that the trader aims at trading only between his/her most profitable
patterns, and therefore S ′ < 2m(2m −1). Increasing the parametermwill increase the waiting time for the coming patterns,
and thus leads to the decreasing number of trading actions. To increase thenumber of trading actions,weneed to increase the
parameter N . Further increasing the parametermwill not essentially affect the trading model if we increase the parameter
N accordingly. Therefore, we fix the parameters S ′ = 2 andm = 3, and perform numerical simulations for different values
of parameter N .
The price evolution of our trading model with linear price impact function for N = 100, and square root price impact
function for N = 100,1000, and different initial seeds are plotted in Fig. 1(a) and (b). For the model with linear price impact
function, the curve for N = 100 fluctuates symmetrically around zero, and the curve for other value of the parameter N
behaves similar to that of N = 100 (not shown in figure). For the model with square root price impact function, it seems
that the price fluctuates similar to that of the financial markets. However, we observe some attractors for some singular
runs, for example the curve for N = 100 with seed2 changes suddenly close to t ′ = 5.0 × 105 and then the system stuck in
a string of periodical history states, which may lead to the abnormal increase of the price.
We first compute the conditional probability p(u, j), which is the conditional probability to have positive, negative and
zero price change, denoted by j = ±1, 0, immediately following a specific history u. In Fig. 2(a), (b) and (c), p(u, j) for the
trading model with linear price impact function for N = 50,100,1000 are plotted. In general, the histograms are not as flat
as that of theMGmodel [16], whichmeans themodel has a bias of price change conditional to a specific history.We observe
that the histogram for larger N is less flat than the histogram for smaller N , which means the price has a relative strong
biased tendency at large values of the parameter N . In Fig. 3(a), (b) and (c), p(u, j) for the trading model with square root
price impact function for N = 50,100,1000 are plotted. The curves for the model with square root price impact function are
less flat than those of the model with a linear price impact function.
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Fig. 2. (Color on line) Conditional probability p(u, j) of the model with linear price impact function for: (a) N = 50, (b) N = 100, (c) N = 1000 at S ′ = 2
andm = 3.
Fig. 3. (Color on line) Conditional probability p(u, j) of the model with square root price impact function for: (a) N = 50, (b) N = 100, (c) N = 1000 at
S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
Fig. 4. (Color on line) Variance of returns σ 2 (circles) and price impact H (stars) for the trading models with linear and square root price impact functions
at S ′ = 2 andm = 3, represented by black and red symbols respectively. The results take average over 100 runs.
The variance of returns is a convenient measure of the market’s fluctuation, and it is defined as
σ 2 = 〈r
2〉 − 〈r〉2
P
. (10)
The smaller σ 2 is, the less the return fluctuates. In Fig. 4, the variance σ 2 for the trading models, with linear and square root
price impact functions are plotted, denoted by black and red circles respectively. For bothmodelswith linear and square root
price impact functions, one observes that σ 2 obeys power-law behavior with a cross-over at approximately N = 100, as an
order of 2m(2m − 1)S ′. σ 2 for the model with linear price impact function shows a power-law behavior with exponents 0.79
for N ∈ [10,100) and 1.81 for N ∈ [100,1000). σ 2 for the model with square root price impact function shows a power-law
behavior with exponents 0.59 for N ∈ [10,100) and 0.92 for N ∈ [100,1000). Compared with the model with linear price
impact function, the model with square root price impact function has a smaller magnitude of price fluctuation, though it
has a stronger biased tendency of price change.
To further understand the price return bias conditional to the market states, we compute the average return conditional
to a given history defined as
H =
∑
u
〈r|u〉2
P
. (11)
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Fig. 5. (Color on line) Predictability K for the trading models with linear and square root price impact functions at S ′ = 2 andm = 3, represented by black
and red circles respectively. The results take average over 100 runs.
In Fig. 4, H for the trading models with linear and square root price impact functions are also plotted, denoted by black and
red stars respectively.We observe thatH obeys power-law behavior similar to that of σ 2, with a cross-over at approximately
N = 100. H for the model with linear price impact function seems constant, and fluctuates slightly for N ∈ [10,100), then
shows a nice power-law behavior with an exponent 1.64 for N ∈ [100,1000). H for the model with square root price impact
function shows a power-law behavior, with an exponent 0.95 for N ∈ [100, 1000). These two exponents are close to half
of the exponents of their price impact functions, which indicates H can be considered as an approximate measure of the
average price impact for large values of the parameter N .
Another important variable is the predictability that traders hope to exploit from the pair patterns
K = 1
P(P − 1)
∑
μ,ν,μ =ν
〈r(t ′)|μ → ν〉2, (12)
where 〈r(t ′)|μ → ν〉 stands for the average price return per time step between the occurrence of μ at time t ′, and the next
occurrence of ν. In Fig. 5, the predictability K for the model with linear and square root price impact functions are plotted,
and a cross-over behavior similar to that of σ 2 and H is observed indicating there maybe exists a phase transition close to
the threshold N = 100. For the model with a linear price impact function, K increases at the early stage of the parameter N ,
and shows fluctuation for N ∈ [10,100), then follows a power-law behavior with an exponent 1.58 for N ∈ [100,1000). For
the model with a square root price impact function, K is a monotonously increasing function of the parameter N , and shows
a power-law behavior with an exponent 0.96 for N ∈ [100,1000). The model with a square root price impact function is
more predictable than the model with a linear price impact function for N ∈ [40,400], and tends to be less predictable if we
further increase the parameter N .
In general, cross-over behavior is observed in themeasure of σ 2,H and K : forN ∈ [10,100), σ 2 increases slowly following
a power-law behavior with a relative small exponent, while H and K seems constant and slightly fluctuated; σ 2, H and K
increase rapidly close to N ∼ 2m(2m − 1)S ′ ∼= 100 and tend to follow power-law behavior with relatively big exponents
for N ∈ [100, 1000). For N > 2m(2m − 1)S ′, those traders who have two pairs of pattern strategies completely repeated,
make the same trading decisions for buying and selling, and this consequently leads to a rapid increase of σ 2, H and K . A
similar cross-over behavior is also observed in Challet’s model: different from our trading model, adding more traders first
decreases σ 2,H and K . This may because that themodel has a fixed number of ‘‘producers’’ who have fixed trading decisions
for historyμ; then all these quantities reach a minimum at an N of order P2; for N > 12P(P −1), σ 2 increases while H and K
tend to be constant, and this may because that the traders with same pair of patterns enter and withdraw from the market
in a synchronous way. The result of our trading model does not seem to conflict with that of Challet’s model.
We then consider the wealth of the traders. The average wealth for each trader W =
∑
i Wi
N , is calculated. In Fig. 6, the
average wealth for each trader for different values of the parameter N at t ′ = 106 are plotted. The circles and stars are for
the tradingmodels with linear and square root price impact functions, respectively. The averagewealth for themodel with a
linear price impact function is close to zero, independent of the parameter N , which indicates that the system is a zero-sum
game. Remarkably, the model with a square root price impact displays a positive wealth sum: the curve increases as the
increase of the parameter N , and can be nicely fitted by a power law with an exponent 0.47 as shown in the insert figure.
The exponent is very close to 0.5, which indicates that the average wealth may be equal to the square root of the system
sizeW ∼ √N . This is not difficult to understand, since the price return is supposed to be decided by the square root of the
excess demand A, which is proportional to the system size N .
To understand why the trading model with a linear price impact function displays a zero sum, and the trading model
with a square root price impact function displays a positive sum, we further investigate the average excess demand bias
〈A|u〉 conditional to a specific history u. In Fig. 7(a), (b) and (c), 〈A|u〉 for the tradingmodels with linear and square root price
impact functions (represented by black and red circles respectively) for N = 50, 100, 1000 are plotted. For the model with
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Fig. 6. Average wealth W for each trader for the trading models with linear and square root price impact functions at S ′ = 2 and m = 3, represented by
circles and stars respectively. The solid line is the curve fitting W ∼ N0.47. Insert figure is the log–log plot of W for the trading model with square root
price impact function and the fitting curve.
Fig. 7. (Color on line) Excess demand bias 〈A|u〉 for the trading models with linear and square root price impact functions for: (a) N = 50, (b) N = 100,
(c) N = 1000 at S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
linear price impact function, the sum of the trader’s wealth mainly depends on the cumulative access demand contributed
by the traders during the holding periods according to Eq. (8). Assuming that the game visits each possible history with a
equal probability, so the sum over τ between two consecutive actions of opening and closing a position could be substituted
by the sum over the possible history states between them. 〈A|u〉 for the trading model with a linear price impact function
is symmetrically distributed above and below zero for different states of history u. |∑u〈A|u〉| displays a value close to zero.
Therefore, we observe a zero wealth sum.
The sum of traders’ wealth for the model with a square root price impact function mainly depends on the cumulative
square root impact of the access demand contributed by the traders during the holding periods, supposing that the sum
of the square root impact of the excess demand at which the traders open and close their positions equals zero, i.e.,∑
i
∑1≤t ′i,1,t ′i,2≤t ′
t ′i,1,t ′i,2
[ 12 sign(t ′i,1)
√
A(t ′i,1)+ 12 sign(A(t ′i,2))
√
A(t ′i,2)] = 0,where t ′i,1 is the time trader iopens a position and t ′i,2 is the
time trader i closes it. 〈A|u〉 for themodel with a square root price impact function is unsymmetrically distributed above and
below zero. |∑u〈A|u〉| displays a nonzero value obviously larger than that of the model with linear price impact function,
e.g., the ratio of |∑u〈A|u〉| between two models with square root and linear price impact functions is 7.56, 18.58, 62.66 for
N = 50,100,1000. The larger the parameter N is, the more unsymmetrical the distribution of 〈A|u〉 is. Some traders have
certain strategies which can help them to effectively exploit the information of the biased excess demand from the patterns,
and they make profits from these high-performed strategies. They have wealth greater than zero while other traders have
an average wealth close to zero. This may leads to a positive sum for the model with a square root impact function.
In Fig. 8 (a), the wealth distribution of the traders for the model with a square root price impact function for N = 100 is
plotted according to the rank of their change frequency of the adopted strategies. We observe that the traders who change
their strategies more frequently have less wealth. Some traders keep using their high-performed strategies to make more
profit, while the otherswho do not have these strategies always shift among their strategies, and have lesswealth. Especially
for some singular runs with attractors, we observe that some traders keep using certain high-performed strategies, and the
others shift among their strategies at the early stage of the evolution, and eventuallywithdraw from themarket, and thus the
system is stuck in a string of period history states. For the model with linear price impact function, the wealth distribution
according to the rank of traders’ strategy changing frequency shows a similar behavior, but displays a zero sum.
To see the wealth distribution among the traders directly, we study the cumulative probability function of the wealth
distribution P(W ) = ∫∞W P(w)dw, namely the probability to find a person with wealth greater than or equal to W .
Considerable investigation with real data has revealed that the tail of the income distribution follows a power law
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Fig. 8. (a) Ranked Wealth distribution of the traders and their corresponding change frequency of the adopted strategies for the model with square root
price impact function for N = 100 at S ′ = 2 and m = 3, represented by dashed and solid lines separately. (b) Ranked wealth distribution of the traders
and their corresponding ages for the trading model with evolution for N = 1000 at S ′ = 2 andm = 3, represented by dashed and solid lines separately.
Fig. 9. Positive tail of the cumulativewealth distribution P(W ) of the tradingmodel with square root price impact function at S ′ = 2,m = 3, andN = 100.
The solid line is the fitting curve P(W ) ∼ W−2.12.
P(w) ∼ w−(1+λ), where P(w) is the probability density function of the wealth distribution, and λ is known as the Pareto
index which has a value between 1 and 3 [17–20]. Therefore, the tail of the cumulative wealth distribution follows a power-
law behavior P(W ) ∼ W−λ. The positive tail of P(W ) for the tradingmodel with square root price impact function is shown
in Fig. 9. One observes that P(W ) obeys a nice power-law behavior in W ∈ [2200, 4400], and the exponent λ is estimated
to be 2.12, in agreement with that of the real markets.
3. Trading model with evolution
MG-basedmodels with dynamic evolution have been studied in Refs. [6,21,22]. For example, in Refs. [21,22] traders with
poor performance can change their strategies. In this tradingmodel, we assume that theworst trader can be driven out of the
market following Ref. [6]. Every 100 time steps, the trader who has the lowest wealth is washed out, and a new trader, with
new randomly selected strategies, is generated. The wealth of the new trader is set to be the average wealth of the traders
at that moment. We use the square root price impact function of the real markets in this evolutionary trading model. With
this evolutionmechanism, the price evolution becomesmore continuous, and seems to be similar to that of the real markets
as shown in Fig. 1.
The conditional probability p(u, j) for different values of the parameter N = 100, 1000 for this evolutionary trading
model are plotted in Fig. 10(a) and (b). It seems that the histograms of the model with evolution are more flat than that
of the model without evolution, for the same values of the parameter N . The introduction of the elimination mechanism
leads to a relatively week biased tendency of the price change. σ 2, H and K for the evolutionary model are also effectively
decreased. In general, the elimination mechanism breaks down the domination of the strategies highly performed in the
trading model, and makes the price fluctuations relatively symmetric.
In Fig. 11, the number of the traders still surviving evolved at time t ′ is plotted. For a large number of traders, e.g.,
N = 1000, those traders who have the strategy (2,5) could survive for quite a long time, and are finally washed out, one
after another, in a short time region. There is no high-performed strategy that always keeps winning after we introduce
the elimination mechanism. We also observe that the time at which the traders are washed out mainly depends on the
parameter N . Fig. 12 shows the time t ′ at which Ps percentage of the traders are washed out as a function of the parameter
N . t ′ increases as the increase of the parameterN , and obeys a power law, with an exponent close to 1.05; notmuch different
for different values of the parameter Ps = 25%, 50%, 75%.
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Fig. 10. (Color on line) Conditional probability p(u, j) of the trading model with evolution for: (a) N = 100, (b)N = 1000 at S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
Fig. 11. Number of traders still surviving evolves with time t ′ for the trading model with evolution at S ′ = 2,m = 3, and N = 1000.
Fig. 12. (Color on line) Time t ′ at which Ps percentage of the traders are washed out for the trading model with evolution at S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
Let us take a look at how the traders’ wealth evolves before they are washed out. In Fig. 13, the distribution of the relative
wealth (Wi(t ′)−W )/W at different times t ′ = 1×106, 2×106, 2×107 are plotted, where i is the rank of the trader’s wealth
and W is the average wealth of the traders at time t ′. For t ′ = 1 × 106, the relative wealth is not continuously distributed
among the traders. Those traders who have higher wealth are clustered in different groups. For t ′ = 2×106, the distribution
remains similar, but the relative wealth difference between the rich traders and the poor traders is not so large, and thus
the curve becomes more flat. At the time just before all the traders are washed out, e.g., t ′ = 2 × 107, the relative wealth
distribution becomes even more flat.
Thewealth distribution of the traders ranked by their ages (survival times) for the tradingmodelwith evolution, is plotted
in Fig. 8 (b). We observe that all the traders have positive wealth due to the evolution mechanism. Those elder traders have
relativelymorewealth than those younger traders, and those traders newly generated, have an averagewealth among them.
A power-law-like behavior is also observed in the measure of the cumulative wealth distribution P(W ), and it displays a
relatively large value, close to the average wealth.
To see whether our trading model can produce the stylized facts of the real financial markets, the return distributions
P(r) of the models with evolution for r = p(t ′ + δt ′) − P(t ′) with different time windows δt ′ ≥ 1 are plotted in Fig. 14 (a).
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Fig. 13. (Color on line) Relative wealth distribution (Wit ′ − W )/W at different time t ′ = 1 × 106, 2 × 106, 2 × 107 for the trading model with evolution
at S ′ = 2,m = 3 and N = 1000.
Fig. 14. (Color on line) (a) Return distribution P(r) of the tradingmodel with evolution for different timewindows δt ′ ≥ 1 at S ′ = 2,m = 3 andN = 1000.
(b) Zero return distribution P(r = 0) of the trading model with evolution for S ′ = 2,m = 3 and N = 1000.
Though the return distributions decay exponentially, the curves for bigger δt ′ display tails fatter than those for smaller δt ′. To
further understand the behavior of the return distribution, we study the peak values at the center of the return distributions
P(r = 0) as the function of different time windows. P(r = 0) is approximated by 15
∑5
i=1(P(i) + P(−i))/2, to average over
the fluctuation close to zero return. In Fig. 14(b), P(r = 0) of the trading model with evolution is plotted in log–log scale.
One observes a power-law behavior with an exponent −0.87, close to −0.71 in real markets [23–26].
4. Trading model with other types of traders
We introduce the traders who have the strategies the same as those in the MG model [1,2], which give the predictions
for all the probable history status, to the trading model with a square root price impact function, but without evolution.
Each of these newly introduced traders has the same number of S ′ randomly selected strategies, and they trade at each
time step, using their best strategies according to the pattern (or history) shared by all the traders. Let Nt and Nm be the
number of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies, and who have the strategies the same as those in the MG
model. Then the excess demand is defined as A(t) = ∑Nt+Nmi=1 ai(t), and the price dynamics remains the same as Eq. (9).
The score of the pair pattern strategy takes the same update form as Eq. (5), and the score of the MG’s strategy is updated
as Ui,s(t ′ + 1) = Ui,s(t ′) − ai(t ′)(P(t ′ + 1) − P(t ′)), i = 1, . . . ,Nm.
The conditional probability p(u, j), and the wealth distribution of the traders ranked by their change frequency of the
adopted strategies for Nt = 100 and Nm = 25, are plotted in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16(a). The number of the traders effectively
trade at each time step Nteff : Nmeff = 1 : 1. The histogram of the conditional probability becomes much more flat than that
of the model has pure traders who have the pair pattern strategies, and the sum of the wealth of the traders who have the
pair pattern strategies tends to be negative. The traders who have the MG’s strategies distinctly affect the behavior of the
traders who have the pair pattern strategies.
We fix the number of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies Nt = 100, and increase the number of the traders
who have the MG’s strategies, one by one, and see how the traders’ wealth behaves. In Fig. 17(a), the average wealth of the
traders who have the pair pattern strategies, and the traders who have the MG’s strategies for Nm ranging from 1 to 25 at
fixed Nt = 100 are plotted. For a small Nm, the average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies is positive, and
larger than that of the traders who have pair pattern strategies. A small number of traders dominates the game, and are fed
by the majority of traders who have a positive wealth sum. Interestingly, at Nm ∼ 5 the average wealth of both types of
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Fig. 15. (Color on line) Conditional probability p(u, j) for the trading model with mixed population Nt = 100 and Nm = 25 at S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
Fig. 16. Rankedwealth distribution of the traderswho have the pair pattern strategies, and their corresponding change frequency of the adopted strategies
for the trading model with mixed population: (a) Nt = 100 and Nm = 25, (b) Nt = 100 and Np = 100 (the number of the traders known as producers) at
S ′ = 2 andm = 3, represented by dashed and solid lines separately.
Fig. 17. (Color on line) Average wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies, and average wealth of the traders who have theMG’s strategies
for the trading model with mixed population: (a) Nm ranging from 1 to 25 at fixed Nt = 100, (b) different proportion of Nt/100 at fixed Nt +Nm = 100 for
S ′ = 2 andm = 3.
trader reaches a maximum. Those two types of trader seem to have a certain state of corporation. As we further increase
Nm, the average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies tends to be negative and smaller than that of the traders
who have pair pattern strategies.
Another case, where the total number of the traders is fixed, is also considered, i.e., Nt + Nm = 100. We change the
proportion of Nt to the total number of the traders. In Fig. 17(b), the average wealth of both types of traders are plotted
for fixed Nt + Nm = 100. The average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies increases with the increase of
the proportion of Nt/100, while the average wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies decreases with the
increase of the proportion of Nt/100. For a small Nt/100, the average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies is
negative and smaller than that of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies, and tends to be positive and larger than
that of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies for Nt/100 ∼ 0.9. This is consistent with the result we obtained for
fixed Nt = 100 shown in Fig. 17(a).
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We also introduce the traders known as ‘‘producers’’ in Challet’s model to the trading model, with a square root price
impact function but without evolution. As it is shown in Fig. 16(b), the introduction of this type of trader can effectively
increase the wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies. Most of the traders who have the pair pattern
strategies have positive wealth, but the wealth distribution is fluctuates more than the model with the traders who have
the MG’s strategies shown in Fig. 16(a).
5. Conclusion
In summary, a trading model with pair pattern strategies evolved with middle prices is introduced. Both linear and
empirical square root price impact functions are considered in the price dynamics, and power-law behaviors are observed
for the return variance σ 2, the price impact H , and the predictability K at large values of the parameter N . The sum of the
traders’ wealth displays a positive value for the trading model with a square root price impact function. An unsymmetrical
distribution of the conditional excess demand 〈A|u〉 is observed, and based on this observation, we give a qualitative
explanation for the positive wealth sum for the model with a square root price impact function. The cumulative wealth
distribution also obeys a power-law behavior, with an exponent 2.12; close to that of real markets. In addition, an evolution
mechanism is introduced to the trading model. Newly generated traders with randomly selected strategies break down the
domination of the strategies highly performed in the model without evolution, and thus leads to a relatively small value for
the biased tendency of the price to change, as well as σ 2,H and K . Power-law behaviors are observed for the time t ′ at which
Ps percentage of the traders are washed out, and the zero return distribution P(r = 0). The traders with the MG’s strategies
are also introduced to the tradingmode. The small fraction of mixed traders are fed by themajority of traders, and thus have
more wealth than others. We also introduce the traders known as producers to the trading model, and find that the traders’
wealth effectively increases.
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